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I.  Background   
The ambit and complexity of international trade relations is considerably larger today than it was 
even a decade ago, when the "end" of the Uruguay Round began seeming to be in sight.  There are 
several reasons for this, salient among which would surely be these.   
First, the primarily tariff-reducing (and that too on manufactured goods trade) goal of the early 
GATT discussions starting with the Geneva talks of 1947 and through to the culmination of the 
Tokyo Round in 1979 has reached an end, and it is widely accepted that future reform within the 
international trade sector can only come by expanding the nature and scope of the issues covered in 
trade talks.   
Second, international trade reform is no longer a hegemony of large and/or rich Northern nations 
controlling a limited multilateral process.  The "new regionalism" coupled with unilateral 
liberalization and opening up at the national level in many countries places the current GATT- based 
system as one among several players in the international trade arena where, of course, some remain 
more equal than others.   
Third, the rapid and accelerating trends towards integration throughout the world and in many 
spheres of economic and social activity - in a word, globalization - highlight the importance of 
interdependence of economic policies, roles and performance.  To take just one example, 
international financial flows are in value much larger than trade flows (the most common numbers 
bandied about are the famous US$ 1 trillion per day in capital movements versus the US$ 5 trillion 
annually in trade).  These capital flows, be they a cause or a consequence of macroeconomic 
instability, create exchange rate movements that swamp in speed and magnitude the ponderous and 
drawn-out changes in nominal tariff rates that are typically the result of pain- staking and politically 
charged trade negotiations.  NAFTA already has a partly implicit and partly explicit "exchange rate 
mechanism".  It should be no surprise, then, that investment patterns are now seen to be part of the 
"trade" agenda, a start to which may be found in the current discussions of investment codes which, 
as discussed below, while microeconomic in their scope have significant macroeconomic 
implications for both sender and recipient countries.   
This paper is not meant to be a review of the literature on national and international trade reform.  
Rather, its purpose is to stimulate discussion on key developments in the international trade relations 
agenda, with a view to organizing a research and policy discussion network on some or all of these 
topics.  In doing so, two points are highlighted and presented as "entry points" (though in true IDRC 
fashion even these are up for discussion).   
First, discussion of the new and emerging issues in international trade relations no longer break 
down along North-South lines.  They never did.  But in the past, the North-South divide was more 
pronounced than others, and so dominated the agenda.  Today, other considerations (intra-South, 
intra-North) have correctly come to the fore.  The constituencies driving the new trade issues are 
diverse, and span the different regions of the globe.  There is now a realization in many circles that 
the least developed countries of the world have little in common with larger developing countries 
like Brazil and India, who in turn find the Asian Tigers to be competitors as often as they are allies 
in trade talks.  Within the developed countries, NGOs may have more in common with grassroots 
organizations and labour unions in developing countries than they do with their own governments, 
business organizations or labour unions.  Not surprisingly, business interests in developing countries 
have more in common with their counterparts in developed countries than with other national 
organizations closer to home.   
A flavour of things to come has already been seen with the organization of the Cairns Group during 
the Uruguay Round.  Its functioning and effectiveness is assessed in Tussie (1993), and this line of 
argument is pursued in the concluding section of this paper.  For now, I simply re- iterate that 
analysis of the new issues in international trade relations - including, from the point of view of the 
proverbial hard-nosed trade negotiator, promotion of national or group interests - is best conducted 
in the context of shifting and eclectic coalitions of countries and/or interests.   
As a more formal analytical issue, I argue later that the theory of clubs as espoused by, for example, 
Buchanan (1965), is worth bearing in mind as the theoretical under-pinning of the current and likely 
future international trade relations scenario.   
Second, the explosive growth in the potential and use of so-called information technologies (ITs) 
coupled with a "shifting coalitions" view of the trade world implies a strong role for connectivity in 
the research and policy process of the project likely to emerge after discussion of this paper.  This 
issue, too, is taken up again in the concluding section of this paper.   
The rest of this paper is designed as follows. The next section briefly outlines key developments and
research possibilities in five "new" topics on the international trade relations front.  These are 
(alphabetically) competition policy, the environment, investment codes, labour standards, and trade 
in services.  The "new regionalism" is not treated separately as a "new issue" but rather is seen as a 
leitmotif in discussing all the other issues.  Specifically, the "new regionalism" poses questions 
common to all the other topics, such as - which is the appropriate forum to discuss and adjudicate 
disputes in these areas, and what lessons are to be learnt from existing trade agreements that have 
taken the lead in attempting to deal with some of the new issues?  Finally, the third and last section 
of this paper concludes by suggesting, without I hope pre-ordaining, a coherent framework within 
which a project may be designed.   
 
II. Key Emerging Issues   
     i.  Introduction   
No attempt is made here to either pass judgement on the five areas covered below or prioritize 
them.  The latter should be self-evident because only a highly selective and judgmental view can 
emerge on whether environmental issues "matter" more than competition policies.  In any case, the 
project group can pronounce more credibly on such matters than a single IDRC official.  This list is 
also not meant to be exhaustive or exclusionary (the Latin American group involved in this work 
with IDRC has identified government procurement as an issue that merits attention.)   
As to the former, by selecting only these issues because they are clearly on the front- burner of 
international trade negotiations I am making a deliberate judgement call.  Significant portions of the 
international community may well consider the fine art of the EU's application of non-tariff trade 
barriers, or Canada's balkanized inter-provincial trade system, or some countries' obsession with a 
notion of intellectual property that ignores indigenous knowledge as important issues that merit a 
place on the international trade relations agenda.  I also acknowledge the concerns of those who 
argue that concentration on "new" issues should not come at the expense of resolution of "old" and 
"left over" issues (these words now almost carry a pejorative meaning) from previous international 
trade discussions.  But the fact is that they do not have a place on the front burner of the 
international trade relations agenda at present, though it is a perfectly reasonable line of enquiry in 
the project to investigate how emerging issues "emerge" - through what process, pushed by which 
constituencies, with what gestation period and with what degree of back-up evidence as to the nature 
of the "problem" at hand.  I delineate these possible research angles because of the interesting and 
quite convincing hypothesis put forth in Krueger (1997) that the link between labour standards and 
trade-related responses cannot be attributed to a straightforward political economy view of policy 
making processes, at least in the U.S.  Instead, labour standards are viewed as a "normal good", 
which is to say they are income elastic.   
The inter-relationships between an enlightened social outlook (say, of certain northern NGOs), 
narrow self-interest (say, of Congressmen representing constituencies adversely affected by cheap 
labour-intensive imports) and technical analysts (such as those who marshal in their favour 
efficiency wage arguments) probably explain better why labour standards enter the international 
trade agenda than over-reliance on any single factor.  Note that even this already complex equation 
has not considered forces in countries that export "cheap labour intensive" goods that push with or 
against the move to turn the spotlight on labour standards, nor the forces at play in determining the 
"response" from the relevant export constituencies.  Note also that even in this seemingly North-
South issue the analysis would be severely hampered if it took a purely or even largely North-South 
view of the world, of which more later.   
A similar tale could be told - and in my view has not as yet been told - for why and how other topics 
have entered or have not entered the priority list of the on-going trade discussions regionally and 
globally.   
ii.  Competition Policies   
 Although competition policies and investment codes are conceptually and practically separate the 
WTO invariably treats the two together.  This is in part a procedural/institutional matter - both are 
somewhat covered by the TRIMs (Trade-Related Investment Measures) Agreement - and equally a 
strategic one - although ostensibly the reason given for the WTO's interest in these subjects is that 
there is a close relationship between trade and investment and trade and competition, the fact is work 
on these matters also proceeds in the OECD and in some regional groupings.  The WTO wishes to 
pre-empt these other initiatives, and it is a matter of active and open discussion that developed 
countries might have a preference to "prestructure" issues within the confines of the OECD and then 
present them as a near fait accompli to the rest of the world community.  I treat these two issues 
(investment and competition) separately, recognizing fully that in significant areas of their progress 
on the international trade front they may move in lock-step.   
The concern with trade and competition policies at the multilateral level is neither new nor 
(arguably) opportunistic.  The origins of their connection go back to the proposal for an ITO which 
saw the light of day only as the GATT.  Specifically, the principal of non-discrimination which 
underlay the founding of the modern international trade system was taken to mean that market 
access could not be differentiated according to the source of the supplier (principally domestic 
versus foreign but presumably also among foreign suppliers.)   
 Also, as government-related barriers to trade have been reduced, attention has naturally turned to 
the nature, structure and behaviour of the private sector.  To be sure, patterns of industrial 
organization have not arisen independently of government action.  But this is a far more complex 
relationship than the one that exists between governments and national tariff structures, for 
example.   
What is new is the move to go beyond conventional, or at least, historic, notions of market access (of 
which the classic example is the ability of Japan's automobile retailing network to exclude American 
car imports) to now include "fair" conditions of competition and the multilateralization of the control 
of anti-competitive practices.  Defining and measuring "anti- competition" has been notoriously 
difficult, even at the national level.  There are significant differences in - indeed in tolerances of - 
oligopolistic and monopolistic behaviour among countries even in cases where the public good has 
been demonstrated to have been damaged, which in theory and in practice it need not always be 
under a monopoly/oligopoly.   
Moreover, a coordinated effort to control anti-competitive practices will of necessity be highly 
selective and highly intrusive.  If adequately enforced, it could result in changes to national 
structures which would give the WTO more visibility in the affected country than almost any other 
international organization has had.  In the event, the best that the WTO's Singapore Ministerial 
Conference (henceforth SMC) could do was announce the creation of a working group to study 
issues raised by WTO members.   
It remains to be seen which issues are raised and by which members.  It should also be interesting to 
see whether indeed the OECD or others can move any faster on this topic.  At first blush, this is an 
area that pits the U.S. against the rest of the world.  Equally, it is a small country- large country 
issue, to the extent that smaller countries of necessity have more oligopolistic production and 
marketing structures than larger countries.  At the same time, small countries are on average more 
open, and may benefit disproportionately from generally more competitive (and therefore less-trade 
distorting) economic structures in the rest of the world.  Given the evident success, not to mention 
historic lineage, of chaebol-like structures in the East and South-East Asian countries, it is not at all 
clear on what economic principle the notions of trade-distortion and efficiency that underlie action in 
this area will be based, nor how these countries will (or can) respond to any significant moves to 
enforce "competition" from abroad.  It is for these reasons among others that Vautier and Lloyd 
(1997) argue for a gradualist approach among small groups of countries, rather than a more 
plurilateral attempt to deal with this issue.  They cite, with considerable and convincing detail, the 
example of the Closer Economic Relations Agreement between Australia and New Zealand as a case 
where even a relatively favourable political economic environment still resulted in only a partial 
practical application of the principles of industrial competition in trade.   
As Feketekuty and Rogowsky (1996) point out, the connotation that the word "contestability" has in 
the trade institutional literature emanating from the WTO and OECD is simply to signify whether or 
not a given market is open to foreign competition.  This is quite different from the meaning of the 
term in the theoretical literature, where it simply connotes the existence of socially optimal 
outcomes even in the absence of perfect competition.  (It should be said, though, that these authors 
are arguing for a competition-based trade agenda, not against it.)   
    iii. The Environment   
Of the five topics covered in this section, the environment and labour standards have the most in 
common.  Each can clearly be analyzed using economic tools and methodologies, though each has a 
significant social dimension - concern for "exploited workers" on the one hand, concern for "the 
environment" on the other - which while important, may also lead to rushed, inappropriate policy 
responses.  Each embodies a range of specific topics that defy a common or generic solution though 
here the environment surely covers more territory than the discussion of labour standards does.  
Also, each has an external driver, namely itself, which is to say one wishes to consider "saving" the 
environment or "treating" labour well for its own sake, not just as a means to an end, such as more or 
more efficient trade.  But finally, each is linked to trade in ways that seem valid and invalid at the 
same time.  The classic exposition of the link between trade and the environment is contained in the 
opening chapter of Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) and re- iterated in Anderson (1997).  This 
connection may be summarized as follows.   
 First, trade and trade policies, by altering the volume and international location of global production 
and consumption activities, impact on the environment.  Some see international trade liberalization 
as worsening environmental problems, while others see it as the vehicle through which incomes and 
awareness of the environment are both raised, thus contributing to the solution to the problem.   
Second, environmental policies in one country (implemented through taxes, subsidies, standards, 
and regulations) can have an impact on others.  The  asymmetries they create affect relative 
competitiveness among countries, and thus the volume, composition, and direction of international 
trade flows.  Indeed, trade-restrictive policies, under the guise of environmentalism, could be (and 
already have been) abused by protectionist countries to further domestic interests.   
Third, multilateral or even bilateral trade negotiations, can be seen as promoting the types of 
international co-operation and dialogue needed to deal with an essentially cross-border issue, the 
environment.   
Thus, in the context of a greening world dialogue, trade policies may be seen as the "carrot" which 
will promote awareness, dialogue and resource availability for sustainable development, as well as 
the "stick" which could be used (and abused) to alter trade flows currently based on the existing 
international competitiveness and institutional milieu.   
Although I state at the start of this section that these links may be both valid and invalid there is now 
little doubt that environmental considerations have entered the international trade arena 
permanently.  Still, it is worth bearing in mind Sen's (1996) assessment of the role of economic 
principles in better understanding the trade-environment nexus of topics.  Among other things he 
argues that while classical principles of trade are not helpful by themselves in either understanding 
trade in the presence of externalities or in developing policy responses to them, "strategic" models of 
trade are well suited to do so.  For example, a country's abundance of "environment" may well be 
used inappropriately ("environmental dumping") or appropriately, to create a dynamic comparative 
advantage.  Moreover, a point that is often over-looked in the trade-environment literature is 
fundamental to any basic treatment of externalities - in the face of non-trivial transactions costs and 
imperfect information, the presence of an externality does not in and of itself confer a role for public 
action.   
On this score, Sen cites the case of a carbon tax, which to be effective would have to be levied and 
administered globally.  In the absence of such an institutional arrangement, there is no reason to 
believe that other second-best solutions, such as national, bilateral or regional agreements, are 
superior to the (sub-optimal) status quo.  Also, there are enough examples of non-harmonized taxes, 
such as the VAT in Europe and sales taxes in the US to suggest that this is primarily an empirical 
matter.  But it is understood that at present, some of the "double dividend" proposals (such as 
combining a national carbon tax with lower payroll taxes and contributions) that have so much 
appeal nationally have little or no resonance at the supranational level.   
 
On the other hand, there are instances where regional agreements have set th such agreement to do 
so between three countries with quite different economic structures.  Wiebe (1996) argues that 
ASEAN members, too, are increasingly inclined to use this historically security-based forum for 
adjudicating environmental matters, while Tussie and Vásquez (1996) find that Mercosur has been 
less useful as a forum to handle environmental matters among members.  This is surprising because, 
as Tussie and Wiebe (1996) argue, Mercosur is the "stronger pillar" [page 9] to bring members 
together on natural resource management issues, which form a sub-set of environmental issues.   
The tendency to see regionalism as the building bloc for multilateralism, at least in a "second-best 
world", is also echoed by Saez (1996) in his study of timber extraction, where the fact that [a] a large 
share of forest products do not enter international trade and [b] forests represent specific ecosystems, 
mitigate against a globally harmonized trade regime that has any chance of being either credible or 
effective.  In his assessment of the ISO 14000 and EU eco- labeling schemes Motta Veiga (1996), 
too, suggests that the superiority of a rules-based (that is, not voluntary) multilateral scheme in each 
case remains to be demonstrated in theory and in practice.  The recent pact between 28 European 
and North American countries to restrict the production and use of 15 known toxic pesticides is 
another example of regional action that may eventually broaden.   
In short, there is now powerful evidence to suggest that not only is public action via trade not 
inherently likely to improve upon an existing sub-optimal situation, the value of action at the WTO 
level must be carefully weighed against the likelihood that limited (what Motta Veiga calls 
"minilateral") agreements including unilateral ones may well be more achievable and more 
effective.   
Still, areas of concern remain to be explored where the global multilateral route may well be the best 
option.  One such is PPMs (production processes and methods) where even the enunciation of a 
common set of principles between countries is problematic.  Another is the movement of hazardous 
waste, which typically crosses not just national but also regional boundaries.  If work ever gets 
started on linking finance to the environment - which is to say extending legal responsibilities for the 
environmental consequences of economic activity to its financiers - then a global multilateral 
framework may well be the only way to progress as a regional agreement would be either 
unenforceable or highly distortionary.  Facilitation of trade in environmentally-sound technology is 
another area where the framework of the TRIPs (Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) already exists to enable such trade though here it is not clear why market forces and private 
action alone, at the firm level, are insufficient to achieve the task at hand.   
The trade-environment area remains rich for further research, both to scope out the potential and 
limits of joint action and also to develop a positive agenda for trade and development.  Although 
conceptually, there is no neat analog for the "efficiency wages" argument discussed below in section 
v, it is intuitively apparent that there is considerable promise in outlining a course of action 
internationally wherein sustainable use of the bio-physical environment and growth go hand in 
hand.  It is less clear where and how exactly trade enters this picture though for our purposes the 
Anderson-Blackhurst logic cited at the start of this sub- section might suffice.   
iv. Investment Codes   
Traditionally, this area has been contentious in the international economic relations arena because it 
harkens back to the days of simple North-South rivalries, in particular the suspicion in many 
developing countries of the activities of American- and European-based TNCs.  Today, the entry of 
investment codes in the international trade relations dialogue is driven by three developments.   
 
First, as WTO (1996a) points out, there has been a dramatic increase in the annual global flow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), from US$ 60 billion in 1985 to US$ 315 billion in 1995.   Second, 
the links between trade and FDI, while having always existed, are now better understood.  The 
general reduction in average national tariff levels has meant that there is less "tariff-jumping" 
occurring now than did previously.  At the same time, the creation of regional trading blocs allows 
inward investment to enjoy economies of scale in production and marketing which did not exist 
previously.  Also, the evidence indicates that FDI and trade are mutually re- inforcing, thus 
countering more pessimistic views of their interaction.  This is particularly true in the Asia/APEC 
region.  Although the entire trade-investment story has yet to be written, Dobson and Yue (1997) 
and Urata (1993) demonstrate convincingly how the interplay of macroeconomic forces (sound and 
stable policies) and microeconomic/institutional forces (savings rates, technology flows, initial 
conditions) has led to a "virtuous circle" between trade, investment and growth in East Asia.  
Industry Canada (1996) estimates the correlation between total trade and FDI stock in APEC 
member economies to vary between 0.768 and 0.995, while the elasticity of trade flows with respect 
to FDI varies between 0.3 and 0.8 and averages 0.6.  In sum, FDI today is neither distortionary nor 
does it inhibit - in fact, it encourages - trade and growth. This is admittedly a sweeping statement on 
which at the very least regional perspectives should be sought. But there is little question that FDI is 
no longer seen with quite as much suspicion as it used to be (the mantle has now passed to portfolio 
investment!) and that its very size suggests that serious thought be given to its assessment whatever 
its net impacts on trade, growth and ultimately development.   
Third, the current regime governing FDI is a patchwork of literally hundreds of bilateral agreements 
which WTO (1996a and 1996b) compares to the situation that prevailed in the trade area in mid-
nineteenth century Europe.  The benefits, then, from multilateralizing this array of agreements arise 
from lower transactions (read negotiations) costs, more transparent and coherent investment 
regimes, more predictability in their operation as countries "lock in" their commitments under WTO 
rules, and less potentially beggar-thy-neighbour competition for FDI among host countries.   
From the point of view of our project, three potential research and policy issues arise here.  First, 
just because FDI and trade are empirically linked does not imply that the WTO is automatically the 
appropriate "vehicle" through which the multilateralization of investment codes should be pursued.  
As its detractors frequently point out, trade is related to everything, giving the WTO no automatic 
call on adjudicating on such a wide array of issues. But this still leaves open the questions, if not the 
WTO then who and how?  Second and related to the first point, the debate on the "new regionalism" 
hinges on whether smaller, more cohesive groups of countries are better able to arrive at consensus 
than a single, large, multi-faceted grouping such as the WTO members.  This in no small part 
explains why the OECD and APEC are working in this area as well.  It may worth be exploring 
which regional blocs are best suited to deal not just with this, but all new trade-related issues where 
learning-by-doing and then knowledge transfer - from one bloc to another - may be more effective 
than the push for a single global consensus.  Third, it is not immediately apparent who is (or more 
precisely who should be) "for" and who "against" regionally or globally harmonized investment 
codes.  This is almost a prototypical "eclectic coalitions" issue.  It is not readily apparent why net 
recipients or net senders of FDI, developed or developing countries, dynamic economies or sluggish 
ones, should prefer a WTO-based regime over a regionally-based one.  I would argue that this 
statement rests even if one considers the push by some countries - admittedly all developing 
countries - to link discussion of multilateral investment codes with multilateral standards for 
corporate conduct.   
 
 
In fact, under some conditions individual countries may well prefer the current regime and this could 
be rationalized in terms of the economist's familiar "agency problem", which is to say the delegation 
of decision making at the heart of the agency issue is significantly different under a bilateral as 
opposed to regional as opposed to global investment regime.  Equally evident, from the point of 
view of the individual firm or country contemplating inward or outward investment, there is no a 
priori basis to assume the superiority of one regime over the other two.  Indeed, there is no way of 
predicting which "sort" of country will prefer which regime unless the issue is much better thought 
through than it is at present.   
v. Labour Standards   
Although there are subtle but no doubt important distinctions to be made here, I treat "human 
rights", the "social clause" and "labour standards" as synonymous concepts, particularly the last 
two.  This issue more than any of the others covered in this paper has a North-South dimension to it 
but as I argue at the end of this sub-section, even here this dichotomy is strained and likely to wither 
rather than intensify in future.   
That labour standards are an emotional issue is not in doubt.  That they go to the heart of 
international trade - because they are the very embodiment of many countries' comparative 
advantage - is also not in doubt.  Recent policy-based responses have centered on the need to 
differentiate between what Stranks (1997) terms the "developmental" aspects of labour utilization 
and the "exploitative" aspects.  But these issues have been known and considered by the 
international body politic ever since the founding of the current international economic system.  In 
fact, of the five principal conventions ratified by ILO members only one dates to a "recent" year 
(1973).  All others go back several decades.  These key conventions cover: freedom of association; 
collective bargaining; abolition of forced labour; prohibition of child labour; and prohibition of 
discrimination in employment   
and equal renumeration of male and female workers.   
Duperrut (1996) summarizes the reasons behind the current move to link labour standards with trade 
(and more specifically with the WTO) as these: [1] moral; [2] employment problems; [3] the 
increasing importance of non-economic themes in international trade relations; and [4] lack of 
enforcement power of the ILO.   
The first is self-evident, and while no less important for it, is not in and of itself an economic or 
political economic research topic.  The third reason is related to the first, meaning that in addition to 
the fact mentioned at the outset of this paper - that tariff reductions are no longer key in trade talks - 
a globalization of values and mores would explain why concerns about trade go beyond economics.  
The second is a statement of the "political economy" view mentioned at the start of this section.  
Although the evidence on low wages and trade success is mixed at best, economists are almost 
categorically "positivist" on this score.  For example, Golub (1995) finds a positive correlation 
between wage levels and productivity in a broad sample of developed and developing countries.  
One implication of this result is that low wage levels do not confer any advantage much less an 
unfair one to countries because they simply reflect low productivity.  However, obviously, low 
wages even if reflective of low productivity may still be offensive to the values of the international 
community and thus explain the drive to "do something" about them.  Perhaps more appealing is the 
now famous "Wood Hypothesis" which purports to show changes in income distribution and wage 
dispersion in industrialized countries that are linked to their trade with developing countries, which 
then explains why protectionist sentiments arise in industrial countries.  Significantly, Wood's own 
policy recommendation is not protection but rather targeted education, training and taxation policies 
in industrial countries.  Finally on the subject of a purely economic perspective on this issue, 
mention should be made of the efficiency wage line of reasoning which is as applicable in low wage 
sectors and countries as it is in high wage ones.  I do not believe that enough thought has gone into 
understanding why a certain wage pattern prevails in an industry if in fact a different one would 
yield equal or better results in terms of productivity and output.  If one combines efficiency wages 
with Golub-type results then the implication is that "beggar-thy-worker" sorts of wages and working 
conditions do not yield superior export results.  It may be worth exploring under which conditions 
and industries this is indeed the case, and under which ones it is not.   
The fourth reason to link labour standards to trade is one that drives a considerable portion of the 
current discussion on this topic.  There is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that some 
constituencies pushing for the primacy of the ILO in this area do so out of no love for or loyalty to 
this institution, but precisely because it has no teeth.  By the same token, some constituencies 
pushing to incorporate labour standards into the WTO discussions no doubt do so because this 
further enables their agenda, be it a genuine concern for workers in developing countries or be it 
straightforward protection for unskilled labour-intensive sectors in developed countries.   
But this precisely illustrates why this issue, too, does not break along neat, readily identifiable lines. 
As the previous paragraph implies, in developed countries, socially-conscious groups and some of 
the more socially-concerned labour unions will find common cause with owners of firms in 
unskilled labour-intensive sectors and some labour unions operating in these sectors to inject labour 
standards into the WTO dialogue.  More intriguingly, there is hardly unanimity among developing 
countries on this score.  Duperrut (1996) reports that South Africa is on the one hand concerned 
about cheap imports (such as textiles) from "low social standards countries" [page 21] while at the 
same time not wishing to antagonize its developing country partners and not wishing to lose its own 
comparative advantage vis-a-vis exports to the U.S. and Europe. There is recent evidence to indicate 
that the Bangladeshi silk industry is concerned about "social dumping" from China.  If one buys the 
Krueger argument cited at the start of this section that labour standards are a "normal good" then 
there is no discontinuity among North-South (ie. rich-poor) lines, but rather a continuous 
progression in concern and in policy as countries - all countries - become richer.   
I summarize possible research issues here as being two-fold.  First, the link between labour 
standards and trade is indirect rather than direct, varies by country and sector, and in any case 
depends on the type of protocol and enforcement mechanism that is negotiated, none of which are at 
all clear at this stage.  And to continue the theme of this paper, second, the various actors on each 
side are driven by interest, experiences and perceptions which make a priori judgements of who will 
say what difficult to portend.   
vi.  Trade in Services   
Unlike the other topics covered in this paper, it is easy to see why services have become a trade 
issue.  They are directly and indirectly traded in large and growing numbers.  As such, and despite 
the fact that they do not hurt if dropped on your foot, they can be analyzed in much the same manner 
as goods trade.  In particular, their welfare effects and the conditions under which the different 
effects hold are similar to movements in more solid merchandise, as Sapir and Winter (1994) 
conclude in their survey of the topic.  Given the peculiar nature of services (storage and 
transportation have unusual connotations in their case) I use the Sapir-Winter taxonomy to 
distinguish between the various forms of services trade.   
   
   
 





Often called "commodity trade" because 
neither provider nor user has to move for 
trade to occur.  Examples include some 
financial services and telework more 
generally, where transactions flow via 
telecommunications networks. 
Here the provider must travel to provide the 
service to the user.  Examples include some 
engineering services where frequent or close 
interaction is not required, or more 
permanent forms of movement such as FDI 
and migration to provide accounting, 




Here it is the user that must travel to 
consume a service.  Examples include 
tourism, education, health care, ship repair 
and airport services. 
No known examples according to Sapir- 
Winter.  Konrad von Moltke suggests that 
examples include ship salvage and certain 
wildlife operations including animal counts, 
tagging and research. 
   
Two points should be noted about trade in services.  First, since services trade was not covered by 
high tariffs in the first place, its liberalization is almost exclusively centred on lowering non-tariff 
barriers to trade, in particular institutional and regulatory hurdles.  Second, the taxonomy above 
shows the diversity in what constitute traded services, and therefore the diversity of national 
interests that are covered by the rubric of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), the 
only multilateral arrangement in the area of services.   
The three most significant areas to have come under the GATS are telecommunications, skilled 
labour movement and financial services.  The recent telecommunications agreement is perhaps best 
seen as a triumph of consumer interests (as championed by large American and a few   
European telephone companies) over regulation-based producer interests in the rest of the world.   
Substantial portions of the issues in financial services trade come under investment codes which are 
discussed in sub-section iv above.  However, as a rule financial services trade remains largely 
illiberal.  Large swathes of the sector, particularly in insurance and banking, come under severe 
national regulation in most developing countries with the possible exception of Latin   
America.  Two reasons are usually offered for this.  First, prudential regulation of this sector may 
well argue in favour of a status quo even under demonstrably high levels of inefficiency.  Second, 
the GATS permits an "economic needs test" whereby a country is entitled to limit foreign entry to   
sectors where the net effect of enhanced competition is deemed to be beneficial.   
   
In surveying the post-liberalization experience of a set of African countries, Medhora and Zarrouk 
(1996) find that greater competition in the banking sector has not resulted in appreciable 
improvements in the sector's efficiency.  This is borne out by quantitative indicators such as lending 
spreads and lag times in processing financial transactions as well as more qualitative indicators such 
as the level and range of service provided by financial service firms.  Such evidence, when coupled 
with more general assessments of financial sector reform, suggest that non-tariff negotiations are 
likely even more complex than tariff negotiations, especially in light of seemingly unattainable 
benefits at the end of the process.  Not surprisingly, "buy in" into the GATS is spotty and some 
observers compare concessions made under GATS at the end of the Uruguay Round to what 
prevailed with goods trade at the start of the GATT system 50 years ago.   
 
Still, the telecommunications agreement suggests that when agreement happens it can happen 
relatively quickly.  The next Round of service negotiations is due to start on January 1, 2000 at the 
latest. It is clear, then, that while conceptually services do belong in trade talks by anyone's 
definition, their range and the non-tariff nature of their liberalization make them one of the most 
difficult issues in the current trade agenda. That significant segments of services form a comparative 
advantage of developed countries does not make the matter any easier, though it should be noted 
here that barriers to their trade within developed countries (say between the U.S., EU and Japan) 
suggest that much progress remains to be made on many fronts by all sides.  Also, as Ajit Bhalla 
points out, some of the comparative advantage currently residing in developed countries (say, in 
low-end financial services) is likely to move to developing countries in the foreseeable future.   
III. Conclusion   
i.  The Cairns Group as a Model for Future Trade Negotiations   
   
By now it should be evident that the emerging international trade agenda comprises a diverse and 
evolving set of issues driven principally by the need to move beyond price to non-price impediments 
to freer trade.  It is expressly not the purpose of this paper to seek a common formal method of 
analysis of this trend in the manner of Axelrod (1984) or Nicholson (1989). However, two themes 
that have run throughout the treatment of the individual issues of the new trade agenda are [1] their 
multi-faceted nature, meaning they are not just economic issues, and [2] the diversity of interests 
involved in the presentation - and therefore ultimate resolution - of each in the international trade 
arena.   
Both these points call for flexibility and agnosticism in their treatment both, as research issues, and 
as policy processes.  There are precious few precedents to this style of operation save one.  The 
Cairns Group formed towards the end of the Uruguay Round (1986) to deal with agricultural issues 
is termed by Tussie (1993) as "an unprecedented type of partnership in international trade 
negotiations, one in which developed and developing countries crossed old   
boundaries and converged" [page 181].  Drawing heavily on Tussie's analysis and that of Anderson 
(1994), this sub-section describes briefly the Cairns process and its possible application to future 
issues in trade relations.  The point here is, to be sure, to bring out the immense potential for this 
form of action to "make a difference" in the international trade arena, but also to highlight the 
specific conditions which perhaps pointed to success (or at least not abject failure) from the very 
start.   
First and foremost, the Cairns Group was galvanized into action by a historically implacable issue 
and widely accepted fault line in freer international trade, the agricultural sector. In practically all 
parts of the world but especially in Europe, Japan, Canada and the U.S., agriculture is characterized 
by sometimes spectacularly inappropriate policies which are visibly so. It is unclear that every other 
emerging topic in trade relations will carry the same connotation that agriculture does, but in their 
ability to grab attention, perhaps labour standards and the environment come close.   
Second, this widely disparate group of countries with latent common interests would not have come 
together as explicitly as it did but for [a] the catalytic role that Australia played in the Group's 
construction, and [b] the sumo-style confrontation between the U.S. and the EC (now the EU), 
where the intervention of a third force had not only the potential to tilt the balance one   
way or the other but also the ability to reduce the degree of polarization between the two principal 
protagonists.  It is unclear if these exact conditions hold in the current issues, though it would be 
ironic if the lesson to be learned here is that movement is only possible on an issue if there is a total 
impasse between two heavy-weights.   
Third, the Group itself was hardly homogenous, but still managed to turn potential fissures (such as 
those between the more outward-oriented and hard-line Latin American members and the avowedly 
supply-management minded Canadians) into strengths, by creating a division of labour   
and responsibilities within the Group.  Here again, there is no a priori reason to expect future 
coalitions to perform as successfully as the Cairns Group did (though it should also be noted that 
since the end of the Uruguay Round and "disbanding" of the Group there has been little progress 
globally on the agriculture front.)   
Fourth, there were developments within Europe itself which made it easier for the EC to consider the 
reform of the CAP.  One was the expected integration into the EC of the EFTA countries, whose 
levels of distortion in agriculture were even higher than those prevailing under the CAP.  The other 
was the need to accommodate the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, even the advanced ones 
of which had a comparative advantage in simple manufactured goods and agricultural commodities. 
Therefore, for purely "domestic" European reasons, the principle that the CAP was sacrosanct within 
the framework of EC policy was beginning to wear just as the Cairns Group itself picked up steam.  
Clearly, the conditions which brought about the establishment and functioning of the Cairns Group 
will not exist in all cases involving international trade negotiations.  However, the very precedent 
that this Group has set suggests that other such ventures are more likely to be formed.  I would argue 
that despite the undesirability of trying to "fit" a unique theory to assess trade negotiations, the 
economic theory of clubs is well suited to explain much of what we observe in international trade 
negotiations today.   
Simply stated, the theory of clubs argues that "pooling" occurs if members are thus better able to 
either increase the net benefits accruing to them or decrease the risk they face from a particular 
situation relative to doing so individually.  It is apparent that this logic is well positioned to explain 
both, regionalism as well as fluid coalitions, particularly the latter.  The Cairns Group allowed a 
group of countries to come together to influence an outcome in a manner which was superior to the 
one that might have prevailed otherwise (that is, either the then status quo or the "EC view" or the 
"U.S. view" on agriculture).  At the same time, "clubbing" lowered the risk that each member would 
have faced (in possible sanctions by the U.S. or the EC, or loss in prestige associated with having 
tilted, alone, against a windmill) had it acted alone.   
The same logic may be used to explain the proliferation of formal regional economic blocs. In fact, 
the choice that countries now face on emerging issues is essentially between [1] dealing with a 
certain issue exclusively through a regional grouping rather than the WTO (for example, the 
NAFTA side agreement on the environment), [2] having their regional group represent them   
at the WTO level (the way Singapore on behalf of ASEAN dealt with labour standards issues at the 
SMC last december), and [3] forming a Cairns-type (ie temporary, fluid, single-issue) coalition at 
the global level.   
In fact, the existence of this range of choices may well be the entry point into the international trade 
negotiations arena for countries who have hitherto been insignificant in either influencing or even 
participating in such negotiations.  (I have in mind traditionally open but marginalized countries 
such as those in sub-saharan africa and central america as well as more transitional cases such as 
Cuba and Vietnam.)   
"Connectivity" that is rapid, credible and operationally effective lies at the core of developing a 
positivist cross-country approach to emerging issues in international trade relations, and I conclude 
this paper with a brief discussion on this matter.   
   
ii. Connectivity and Networking do  to Make a Difference   
   
For the purposes of this paper (that is to say, for the purposes of motivating the creation of a global 
research for policy network on emerging trade issues) connectivity and networking imply the 
following.  First, country positions and perspectives have to be appropriately articulated and backed 
by solid analysis.  This requires not only a link between the "research sector" and the   
"policy sector" in individual countries but also the creation and development of a civil society on 
trade issues.  In other words, credibility implies both an internal consensus or national dialogue so 
that country perspectives carry a degree of moral authority, as well as public stances that are backed 
by strong analytics.   
Second, for common perspectives to be identified, developed and pursued expeditiously, the internet 
can play a key role.  In other words, knowledge creation is more effective when it is generated with 
the ready and rapid exchange of information among a large number of participants, and the internet 
is uniquely positioned to bring this form of electronic connectivity to several sets of groups (research 
institutions, government agencies, universities, NGOs) concerned with international trade issues the 
world over.  I am assuming here that "virtual networking" of the sort associated with the internet is 
more congruent with the notion of "fluid coalitions" proposed in this paper than any other procedural 
modality known to us at present.   
Third, and especially relevant for our immediate purposes, electronic connectivity cannot in and of 
itself constitute an "IDRC project".  What is being argued for here is a global network that operates 
at two levels.  At one level, it will be a traditional research for policy network that would produce a 
set of national, regional or thematic studies on the topics covered in section II of this paper, bringing 
together in the process researchers and trade officials nationally and internationally.  At another 
level, this network would be a mechanism for a larger number of groups than the "research" portion 
of our work would comprise, to come together and establish a more-or-less permanent forum on the 
current and future international trade agenda.   
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